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'53, 137-10-20; further that prior to the 1953 revision of the Colorado Statutes, Sec. 255 of said Chapter 227 of the 1937 Session
Laws contained the word "hereafter" providing among other things
that before any purchaser of land hereafter sold for taxes receives
a tax deed, the County Treasurer shall send notice to parties in
interest, not more than five months and at least three months before the time of issuance of the tax deed. The Court points out
that in the 1953 revision the word "hereafter" was omitted, but
in any event the revision was not in effect on the date application
was made by plaintiff for a deed and the land was sold for 1931
taxes and tax certificate issued in 1932, prior to the 1937 amendment now part of 137-10-28.
The Court said that it was obvious that its decision must be
that the property was sold for taxes prior to 1937 amendment of
137-10-28; that the records showed that the assessed valuation was
less than $100 and that no notice was required to be given prior
to the issuance of the tax deed.

TORTS
By RICHARD D. HALL of the Denver Bar

Many interesting and significant decisions in the field of
torts have been handed down by the Colorado Supreme Court during the past year. The most important of these cases, in my opinion, are the following:
(1)

IMPUTATION OF NEGLIGENCE

In Moore v. Skiles, 130 Colo ...... 274 P. 2d 311, the plaintiff,
a passenger in a truck owned jointly by her and her husband, was
injured when the husband drove the truck into a collision with
the defendant's car. The plaintiff, Mrs. Moore, and her husband
were returning home after an evening with friends.
The trial court, over the objection of plaintiff's counsel, instructed the jury that if it found "that the accident would not have
occurred but for the combined negligence of both drivers, then the
plaintiff can not recover for the damages which she claims to have
suffered . . ." The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, and the appeal followed. The Colorado Supreme Court, after
noting the general rule that the negligence of a driver is not to be
imputed to a passenger in the car, Colorado and Southern Railway
Company v. Thomas, 33 Colo. 517, 81 P. 801; Parker v. Ullom, 84
Colo. 433, 271 P. 187; Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Company,
53 Colo. 458, 128 P. 460, then proceeded to hold that the case at
bar fell within a well recognized exception. Thus, where the passenger by reason of joint ownership of the vehicle was in a position to exercise control over the driver, and was physically present
in the automobile, which was being used for a common purpose,
the negligence of the driver, if any, was imputed to the joint owner

Nov.-Dec., 1955

DICTA

riding as a passenger. The Supreme Court approved the above instruction and affirmed the judgment.

(2) DoG BITE LIABILITY
Traditionally, liability for injuries inflicted by a dog required
proof of prior knowledge by the owner of the dog's vicious propensities, and in most cases proof was required of at least one prior
incident involving injury to some other person. However, in
Barger v. Jimerson, 130 Colo .....- ,276 P. 2d 744, the Court affirmed
a judgment for $4,773.00 against the owner of a dog which attacked
and severely injured a Mrs. Jimerson, but was not proved to have
bitten any other person. The Court repeated the general rule that
the owner must have had notice before such accident of the vicious
propensities of his dog, but held that proof as to its vicious appearance and barking and constant confinement behind a fence was
sufficient proof as to knowledge by the owner of such fact. Upon
proof of such knowledge, the owner was held to keep the dog at
his own peril.
(3) RES IPSA LOQUITUR
In LaRoco v. Fernandez, 130 Colo .-... , 277 P. 2d 232, the
deceased, while driving his car behind the automobile of the one
defendant, Fernandez, was killed when the Fernandez car sideswiped the oncoming car of the second defendant, Lannan, which
then struck the deceased's car. In their answers each defendant
denied being negligent himself, but admitted that the other defendant was negligent. In their opening statements, counsel for each
defendant stated that their evidence would show that the other
defendant was over the center line and therefore negligent.
The plaintiff's evidence failed to indicate which of the two
defendants was across the center line at the time of the first impact, and accordingly the trial court granted the motion of each
defendant for dismissal at the close of the plaintiff's case. The
Supreme Court stated that "in a proper case a judgment may be
entered for or against a plaintiff as a result of admissions by counsel in the opening statement," and noted that the same was true
as to pleadings. The Court then concluded that under the pleadings and opening statements a jury question was presented without specifically discussing the point that in this case the "admissions" in question were not true admissions against the interests
of the defendants making them, but were more in the nature of
allegations by each defendant against the other defendant who
had an adverse interest. The Court also, at the conclusion of the
decision, stated that "the circumstances as to the accident speak
for themselves, and therefore the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applicable." This appears to be the first application in Colorado
of such rule to a case where control of the circumstances surrounding the accident was not wholly within the power of the defendant
against whom the rule was asserted. We may expect to see this
case cited frequently in future litigation where the plaintiff is
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obviously an innocent party but there is substantial doubt as to
which of several defendants is responsible.
(4)

TORT LIABILITY OF ASSOCIATION MEMBERS

In Thomas v. Dunne, 130 Colo ... ,279 P. 2d 427, the Supreme
Court considered a judgment which had been entered in favor of
a plaintiff who had been injured during a meeting of the Al Kaly
Temple, an unincorporated association with 1,753 members at the
time of the trial. Upon a jury verdict, judgment had been entered
by the trial court against the association and also against eleven
individual members of the association, none of which individuals
were proven to have taken an active part in the events which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that
the individual defendants were named as representatives of the
class consisting of the entire membership, and held that the provision in the old Code of Civil Procedure which limited such a
judgment to one against the joint property of the association itself
was still in effect. Thus, the judgment against the Al Kaly Temple
was affirmed and the judgments against the individual defendant
members were reversed.
(5)

UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT

In Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Shupe, 131 Colo .... .,
280 P. 2d 1115, plaintiff's truck stalled on a railroad crossing about
dusk, where it was struck by defendant's train. There was conflicting testimony as to visibility and as to the opportunity to see
the lighted fuse set by the plaintiff.
On appeal a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on a jury verdict was reversed for failure of the trial court to give an instruction on "unavoidable accident" tendered to the Court by counsel
for the defendant. The Supreme Court noted that the evidence
raised such an issue, and in answer to the assertion that such defense was not pleaded and therefore could not be injected into the
case at the time the instructions were being prepared, stated,
"while it is the usual practice to plead unavoidable accident as an
affirmative defense, the fact still remains that unavoidable accident
is but a denial of negligence, and in this case where the pleadings
disclosed that there were mutual denials of negligence, the issue
is in the case."
(6) LAST CLEAR CHANCE
The doctrine of last clear chance as developed by a large number of decisions of our Supreme Court, has been a doctrine normally
pleaded by the plaintiff in reply to the defense of contributory
negligence as alleged by the defendant in his answer. in the case
of Rein v. Jarvis, 131 Colo ......
281 P. 2d 1019, the DEFENDANT in
his answer alleged, among other things, that the plaintiff had the
last clear chance to avoid the collision which was the basis of the
suit. Judgment was entered by the trial court in favor of the
plaintiff upon a jury verdict and defendant cited as error the re-
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fusal of the trial court to give an instruction tendered by the defendant as to the doctrine of last clear chance as alleged in his
answer.
The Court stated in its opinion that last clear chance was a
doctrine available to a plaintiff when such plaintiff is met with a
defense of contributory negligence. The Court then went on to
state that if the doctrine could be invoked by defendant, it would
be a confusing method of charging plaintiff with contributory
negligence. In other words, before the occasion could arise where
the doctrine could be invoked, the plaintiff already would be barred
by his contributory negligence. The judgment in favor of the
plaintiff was affirmed.
(7)

FALSE ARREST

The case of Hart v. Herzig, 131 Colo ...... 283 P. 2d 177, is interesting in holding that where an invalid summons was served
upon the plaintiff for alleged violation of the Game and Fish Law,
and the plaintiff in accordance with such summons appeared in
Justice Court, there was no false arrest giving rise to a tort cause
of action. The Court in its opinion made clear that there must be
an intention to take a person into custody before there can be a
false arrest, and that a notification or command to a person to appear at a later date before a magistrate does not put such a person
under arrest any more than a witness is under arrest when served
with a subpoena. The judgment in favor of plaintiff was reversed
on the above and other grounds.
(8)

PROOF OF NOTICE OF UNSAFE CONDITION OF FLOOR

The case of F. W. Woolworth Company v. Peet, 131 Colo.....
284 P. 2d 659, involved a claim by the plaintiff for injuries received
from a fall in the defendant's store resulting from her slipping on
some excrement in an aisle. There was no evidence introduced as
to when or how the substance got onto the floor. Under this state
of the evidence, the Supreme Court reversed a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff on a jury verdict, stating that as a matter of law
the plaintiff had proven no negligence on the part of the defendant
store as there was no evidence that the substance had been on the
floor for an unreasonable period of time. This case was not new as
to this doctrine, but strengthens the law on this point as found in
the prior cases of Atkinson v. Ives, 127 Colo. 243, 255 P. 2d 749,
and Denver Dry Goods Co. v. Pender, 128 Colo. 281, 262 P. 2d 257.
(9) DEFINITION OF GUEST UNDER GUEST ACT

In Hoilenbach v. Fairbanks, 132. Colo ..... , 287 P. 2d 53, the
Court had before it the issue as to whether the deceased wife of the
plaintiff was a guest at the time of the fatal aucident. The deceased
at such time was riding with the defendant's wife, who was on
her way to town to get an angle iron for use by the plaintiff on
his truck, and for which he had agreed to later reimburse the defendant. After reviewing the rather involved fact situation, the
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Supreme Court held that the deceased was a guest within the
meaning of the Guest Act as there was no proof that the benefit
conferred upon the defendant was sufficiently real, tangible, and
substantial as to serve as an inducing cause for the transportation.
The Court in this case followed such doctrine as originally enunciated in Klatka v. Barker, 124 Colo. 588, 239 P. 2d 607.
(10

NECESSITY OF ELECTION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES

Although the case of American Furniture Company v. Veazie,
131 Colo .....- ,281 P. 2d 803, might also be considered as within the
field of sales, such decision established an important rule of law
on an issue frequently arising under the law of torts. In this case,
a gas kitchen range, sold by the defendant store to the plaintiff and
later checked on two occasions by the defendant's service man,
exploded approximately four months after its sale with resulting
injury to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff in her complaint alleged a claim for relief based
on breach of an implied warranty of fitness, and also claim for
relief based upon negligence. The trial court submitted both claims
to the jury under three forms of verdict, the jury returning a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff on both of the claims despite the
instruction to return but one form of Verdict. The Supreme Court
in reversing the judgment in favor of the plaintiff held that there
was no implied warranty in this case because the stove was sold
under its trade name, and also held that there was no evidence
before the court of any negligence on the part of the defendant
store which was a proximate cause of the explosion. Of more
general interest was the statement of the Supreme Court that the
trial court should have required the plaintiff to elect which of the
two causes of action would be submitted to the jury, as it was
apparent that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover on both
theories for one injury.
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